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Integration Policy and Outcomes for the 
Russian-Speaking Minority in Estonia
Silviu Kondan and Mridvika Sahajpal
University of Toronto
Abstract
 Estonia’s integration policy vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking residents was devel-
oped and reformed several times since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While 
comparative data from the international community certainly indicates that Estonia has 
progressed in the realm of social, political and societal integration, the ‘success’ for each 
individual policy is now increasingly measured—and contested— within broader consid-
erations of geopolitical security and minority rights. The authors converge interview-based 
data compiled from various representatives and scholars of nongovernmental organizations, 
government agencies, and think tanks with secondary research on the topic of Russian 
minority integration in Estonia. The report will seek to address the ways in which various 
representatives in both mainstream and bottom-up organizations score and assess Estonia’s 
development in citizenship, education, and language policy domains for the Russian-
speaking minority. 
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Introduction and Research Proposal
Estonia, alongside its Baltic neighbours, has been described as one of Europe’s 
most geopolitically significant countries. Their relatively successful transition into Western 
European institutions, the region’s proximity to Russia, and most pressing and debated, the 
socioeconomic integration of the Baltic’s large Russian-speaking minorities1 has gathered 
international debate and discourse (Duina & Miani, 2015, p. 535). The ways in which inte-
gration policy is implemented, reformed, and reviewed has informed both international and 
national discussions, often with debates centering domestic policies and foreign affairs. The 
discourses surrounding integration and minority policies are especially important as they 
are the center of contestation between the majority and minority populations (Kymlicka, 
1996, p. 2). While Estonia has progressed rapidly to include more favorable policies 
towards its minorities, there is still debate regarding those with undetermined citizenship, 
the accessibility of the naturalization process, the socioeconomic position of minorities, the 
mechanisms of Russian state influence, and the protection of the titular language status. For 
instance, the potential for Russia to utilize the minority as diplomatic leverage has become 
a key debate surrounding integration and the larger stability of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). At the same time, concern over language planning and language acquisition policy, 
alongside citizenship policies that have constructed the undetermined citizenship identity2 
have been a continuing concern for the Russian-speaking minorities and the organizations 
that advocate on their behalf. 
 For the purposes of conducting primary research, the authors met with various 
representatives known to work with Russian speakers or who have knowledge on the 
contemporary issues related to integration related policy outputs. These include scholars 
within academic institutions, Estonian government institutional branches, think tanks, and 
non-governmental organizations.3 The qualitative interviews focused on how these organi-
zations deal with aspects of integration, citizenship, and education; including perspectives 
on integration resources and security research. This report will therefore converge topics 
related to integration and security to produce a more nuanced analysis of what integra-
tion looks like for the Russian-speaking minority. Similarly, this report will also touch 
upon the broader security concerns affecting Estonia’s stability and how integration plays 
an important role in defense planning. It is noted, however, that the authors did not con-
duct personal interviews with individual subjects with undetermined citizenship because 
1   This paper makes specific reference to the Russian-speaking minority, comprised of former Soviet citizens 
who settled in the Baltic territories between 1945 and 1991.  This predominately includes ethnic Russians but 
also other groups including Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc. While the various ethnic groups continue to have distinct 
histories and relations to the Estonian majority, they represented a larger group that historically has had closer 
linguistic and cultural connections to Russia (Agarin, 2010, p. 10).
2  In Estonia, the term ‘a person with undetermined citizenship’ references “a person who has been left without 
previous citizenship due to the disintegration of their state of citizenship”. This is different than the term ‘state-
less,’ which refers to “a person who doesn’t have a citizenship of any state and who does not have a possibility to 
receive it by their free will”. Since Russian-speaking minorities are able to receive Russian citizenship, they are 
not termed stateless. While this definition is not codified in law - under national law ‘alien’ is still used to define 
anyone who is not an Estonian citizen’ (UNHCR, 2016, p. 19-20).
3   Reference Author's Notes on pages 118-119.
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the vocalization of traumatic memories can produce further traumatization.4 Instead, the 
authors refer to secondary data when basing their analysis on the firsthand opinions of those 
with undetermined citizenship. The authors also use opinions and information provided 
in primary interviews that were conducted with representatives of organizations that serve 
these populations as advocates and service providers. 
The authors position various perspectives on the success of policy outcomes 
according to theme so that the reader is able to identify the ways in which policies yield 
different, but equally substantive, understandings of integration. The report is split into 
two overlapping sections based on larger themes: Geopolitics and Integration. In the first 
section, the authors reveal nuance in opinion formation regarding integration as related to 
current geopolitics and security vis-à-vis the Russian geopolitical “threat.” In the second 
section, the authors reveal nuance in opinion formation regarding the effects of citizenship, 
language, and education policy, emphasizing a minority-centric perspective. While the 
various perspectives formulate opinions that prioritize either security or minority rights, 
neither purposely discounts or disregards the opinion of the other. Additionally, this paper 
is meant to demonstrate the points of convergence and divergence of opinion and not to 
deem one as more crucial or necessary. 
A Brief Contextualization of Integration Policy in Estonia
Understanding the context in which integration policy has developed since 
Estonia’s independence necessitates breakdown of recent history. Particularly important 
are the demographic legacies that the Soviet occupation of Estonia between 1940 and 
1991 has left. While there were small numbers of Russian-speaking minorities present in 
Estonia prior to Soviet occupation, by the late 1980s they constituted 30.3 percent of the 
total population (Agarin, 2012, p. 8). This huge influx of Russian speakers, through Soviet 
re-distribution and migration policies, worried those who believed that the Estonian lan-
guage was endangered (Cilevics, 2007, p. 168). This fear towards Russian imposition was 
considerable at the time as Russian was compulsory in schools and maintained the status 
of the lingua franca across the Soviet Union. While the Estonian language was offered in 
public schooling alongside Russian and, in fact, was financed to some extent by the Soviet 
government, a strict diglossia formed where bilingualism became far from equal (Cilevics, 
2007, p. 167).5
Upon independence in 1991, the titular language, with the goal of inscribing its 
superiority, formulated specific language and citizenship policies that explicitly addressed 
4  In UNHCR studies from 2016 only 15 out of 150 persons of undetermined citizenship agreed to discuss their 
social, economic and political situation, out of general apprehension towards participation (“Mapping Estonia," 
p. 36). 
5   Mediums that were Russian dominated included areas of state, transportation, the military, most large-scale 
industries, and the security sector (Cilevics, 2007, p. 167). Only the Russian language was permitted for official 
use in Estonia (Cilevics, 2007, p. 167). This meant that while the titular population was bilingual in both their 
language and Russian, Russian-speakers were by large monolingual.
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the territory’s languages and the access of citizenship for the non-titular population.6 This 
was also followed by the prioritization of the jus sanguinis citizenship principle, which essen-
tially restricted citizenship from those who did not permanently live in the country prior 
to Soviet occupation. This was a way of reaffirming the importance of Estonian nation-
building through the codifying of monolingualism and strict citizenship policy (Cilevics, 
2007, p. 170). Essentially language and citizenship policies were now used to inscribe who 
belonged to the nation and who was ‘alien.’ Ideological fears propelled these policies to 
undo Estonia’s history of uncertainty under the Soviet Union and to build a nation-state 
prioritizing the advancement of the ethnonational population.
Showing clear desires of joining the European Union (EU) from the onset of 
their independence, Estonia soon began to adapt new revisions to their citizenship and 
language policy in order to conform to accession requirements and to stabilize geopoliti-
cal affairs. Opening up to Europe, meant reopening history, security, and the market to 
Europeanizing institutions that were once isolated from the country (Galbreath, 2007, 
p. 234). For Europe and the West, moderating Estonia through: the recommendations 
made by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE), Europarty 
political stances, EU accession requirements, and NATO security goals became crucial as 
geopolitical security was now seen as a continental investment (Galbreath, 2007, p. 243; 
Bennich-Bjorkmana & Johansson, 2012, p. 595). As Estonia’s citizenship and language 
policies matured, the process of naturalization became more progressive so as to allow for 
Russian speakers to integrate into Estonian society. This was sustained vis-à-vis continued 
pressures and recommendations from external bodies. More recently as European tensions 
with Russia have increased, critics have questioned whether the Russian-speaking minori-
ties have successfully integrated in Estonian society or if cleavages exist that might pose a 
security risk for the wider region. 
The authors’ interviews with various representatives in Estonia bring into light the 
debates surrounding integration policy outcomes. The opinions of each respective inter-
viewee fall in line with broader perspectives that identify integration policies as being posi-
tive or negative. The following section will outline the dominant geopolitical perspectives 
and how integration often interjects larger discussions surrounding the security of Estonia. 
The subsequent section will touch upon the Russian-speaking population in more detail, 
outlining how the integration debate affects the everyday lives of Russian speakers.
1.0 Geopolitics
1.1 Hybrid Warfare
The geopolitical perspective centralizes security concerns of the Estonian govern-
ment, regional states, and transnational bodies and the methods they use in deterring poten-
tial threats against Estonia’s sovereignty. A particularly salient facet of security studies in 
Estonia’s contemporary discourse is the subject of hybrid threats. Hybrid threats, similar to 
‘hybrid warfare’, describes a developing method of conflict that is produced as an extension 
6  With the Perestroika movement throughout the 1980s, the Soviet Union allowed for more regional autonomy 
in the Baltics. During this time, the parliament of Estonia began adopting declarations that assigned the titular 
language at the state level and in state planning (Cilevics, 2007, p. 169). This was followed by the 1989 Estonian 
SSR Language Law (Cilevics, 2007, p. 169).
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of conventional deterrence and insurgent campaigns, with the purpose of achieving political 
and military motives (Lanoskza, 2016, p. 176; Kalinina, 2016, p. 148). Specifically, hybrid 
threats are used to undermine the opponent’s territorial legitimacy and to cause internal 
disruption and distrust (Lanoskza, 2016, p. 176). Hybrid threats, which rely on soft power, 
are at the core of Baltic geopolitical discourses as a defining framework for the Kremlin’s 
actions towards its Western borders. 
Estonia, having spent two percent of its GDP in 2016 on its military (The World 
Bank, 2016) and currently hosting NATO troop deployments at its eastern front, must 
maintain military safeguards against the possibility of conventional warfare. However, the 
scope of interstate conflict has developed to include more nuanced mediums such as eco-
nomic, cultural, and technological platforms (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, 
February 2017). As these new threats are less visible and more interconnected, Estonia’s 
role in boosting its security and defense strategies has become integral to its sovereignty 
and protection against Russian aggression (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, 
February 2017).
1.2 The Targets of Kremlin Aggression
 Deterring the Kremlin’s methods of hybrid warfare has become a unique task 
for the Baltic States and NATO alike. Broken international agreements, historical cleav-
ages between CEE and Russia, and the use of a combination of hard and soft power have 
worried members of the international community that another conflict in Eastern Europe 
could resurface (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, February 2017). Fear that the 
Kremlin will extend its influence through military intervention in the Baltics, as has been 
the case of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, has rapidly dominated much of international 
reporting on the region. Yet, the pressing fear is not conventional warfare with Estonia and 
other members of NATO in the upcoming months, but rather Russia’s ability to mobilize 
its goals through the primary use of soft power (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, 
February 2017). 
One particular threat that has made hybrid defense a central discussion related to 
policy has been the dissemination of ‘disinformation’ from Russia. The invasion of Crimea 
has been characterized by Russia’s ability to instigate pro-Russian demonstrations, forgather 
favourable opinions of Russian annexation, and propagate distrust and false claims about the 
Ukrainian government with the purpose of legitimizing its own military actions (Lanoszka, 
2016, p. 175; Kalinina, 2016, p. 148). In a show of Russian disinformation, official media 
and social media in Eastern Ukraine portrayed Ukrainians as cold-blooded murderers, 
molesters, and crucifiers of women and children (Veebel, 2015, Russian Propaganda, 
Disinformation, and Estonia’s Experience; Kalinina, 2016, p.151). These attacks have par-
ticular effects on countries with ethnic cleavages in that it exacerbates ethnic tension and 
division. 
For instance, the watershed removal of a Soviet memorial statue from central 
Tallinn, coined the ‘2007 Bronze Statue Conflict,’ has had far reaching ethnopolitical 
implications. Large-scale demonstrations by Russian-speakers in both Estonia and Russia, 
were further exacerbated by Russian media outlets who framed the removal of the statue 
as an attack on Russian nationhood. The demonstrations were furthermore deemed by 
Russian news reports as a ‘failure of Estonian [Russian-speaking] integration and the re-
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emergence of fascism in the country’ (Bruggemann & Kasekamp, 2008, p. 436). Such cases 
of disinformation alarmed Estonian policymakers, as Russian-speaking minorities increas-
ingly became visible targets and consumers of anti-Estonian propaganda. 
1.3 Mediums of Warfare “Disinformation” and Media in Estonia
The manipulation of media has become a heated policy discussion in Estonia. 
In fact, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) has released multiple recom-
mendations on the ways in which Estonia can defend itself from disinformation (Lucas 
& Pomeranzev, 2016, p. 2). Roughly 72 percent of Russian speakers claim that Russian 
language television channels are an important source of news information for them (Open 
Estonia Foundation & Saar Poll, 2014, p. 7). The threat of disinformation resurfaced once 
again in 2016, when the Russian media station, Vesti-Rossiya 24 TV, broadcasted a false 
report on Victory Day demonstration in Sillamäe, Estonia (Lucas & Pomeranzev, 2016, 
p. 21). CEPA asserts that the purpose of this claim is to vilify Estonia and display the dis-
satisfaction of the local population with the state (Lucas & Pomeranzev, 2016, p. 21). The 
long-term aim of such reporting, according to CEPA, is to: “create a situation in which 
future aggression against a Baltic ally like Estonia might be accepted as warranted by the 
Russian public; justified to the international community; and received with resignation by 
local governments and their populations” (Lucas & Pomeranzev, 2016, p. 21). 
With the implementation of the 2007 Estonian Public Broadcasting Act, Estonia 
Public Broadcasting (ERR) became responsible for meeting the information needs of all 
populations in Estonia (Joesaar, 2015, p. 46). Under this Act, ERR established ETV+ as 
an alternative Russian language channel to all external Russian broadcasting (Joesaar, 2015, 
p. 48). The success of ETV+ has been consistently analyzed based on its goal of deterring 
Russian disinformation. 
Representatives of various organizations have identified three contrasting perspec-
tives on ETV+ and its ability to assist with the integration of Russian speakers within the 
Estonian information sphere. In regards to the security perspective, there has been dissatis-
faction on the content being broadcasted by the ETV+. Specifically, some fear that Estonia 
continues to be left vulnerable to Russian disinformation because there is no process for 
determining the validity of material being shown (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal inter-
view, February 2017). The network’s open and unregulated invitations to Russian spokes-
people, representatives, and sponsors imply little media accountability related to security 
concerns (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, February 2017). Deregulation of 
media inaccurately reflects the exact potential of Russian disinformation and fails to fully 
equip the Russian speakers with the needed protection against propaganda. 
The second perspective surrounds the political nature of the content being shown. 
The Estonian Ministry of Interior (M. Tulit, personal interview, February 2017) empha-
sized the need to broadcast cultural and entertainment programming rather than political-
based programming due to the overtly political nature surrounding minority integration. 
This has become a particularly significant debate since Russian speakers have become 
generally less trusting of political news from both sides (M. Makarova, MISA, personal 
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interview, February 2017).7
The final perspective concerns the scope and marketing potential of ETV+. 
Rather than focusing solely on convincing Russian speakers to watch ETV+, MISA sug-
gested that it is important to consider how ETV+ can be marketed as a bridging tool 
between the ethnic communities existing in the country. Since ETV+ broadcasts Russian 
movies and entertainment programming, it has the potential of being used as a cultural 
exchange and language-learning medium for ethnic Estonians (M. Makarova, MISA, per-
sonal interview, February 2017).8 This perspective presents ETV+ as a unifying and mutu-
ally benefitting medium. MISA furthermore advocated for ERR to utilize this potential by 
increasing marketing and making programs more accessible to Estonian audiences through, 
for instance, closed captioning. 
 Opinions on outcomes and best practices reveal how broader perspectives influ-
ence policy. The success of television programming bridging the population under one 
medium has the potential of mitigating risks associated with Russian disinformation. On the 
other hand, the appeal of such a channel must be considered with the target audience—the 
Russian-speaking minority—in mind. Ultimately, ETV+ must meet both the needs and 
interests of the target audience without infringing on their media autonomy. 
2.0 INTEGRATION
2.1 Ethnic Division 
As noted in “Contextualizing Integration Policy in Estonia,” Estonia has made 
strides in reforming its naturalization and language policies. This, however, does not mean 
that the gap between the two ethnolinguistic groups has closed. Dissatisfaction and lower 
socioeconomic opportunities persist for Russian speakers. Similarly, a lack of interaction 
between the two groups continues. According to the Integrating Estonia 2020 report pub-
lished by the Ministry of Culture, 45 percent of Estonians do not interact with representa-
tives of other nationalities and 27 percent claim that there are no other nationalities in their 
circle of closest acquaintances (Ministry of Culture, 2014, p. 7). Moreover, almost one 
third of Russian speakers with permanent residency do not feel as if they are a part of the 
Estonian national community (Ministry of Culture, 2014, p. 7).9 With this in mind, the 
integration of both groups within one inclusive state continues to be an ongoing challenge.
Multiple interviewees shared the perspective that political rhetoric and policy 
7  MISA asserts the need to include debates and discussions in ETV+ in order to convey differences in perspec-
tives and to allow for opinion formation. However, it appears that the selection of content is in fact quite limiting. 
The media market, about 300,000 viewers, is rather small compared to Estonian language broadcasting channels. 
Competition and unwillingness by advertisers  to finance ETV+ decreases  the availability of content  (Joesaar, 
2015, p. 50).
8   This is especially salient as the younger Estonian-speaking generations might benefit from learning Russian in 
bilingual capacities. At the same time, older Estonians already fluent in Russian can watch ETV+ for entertain-
ment purposes (M. Makarova, MISA, personal interview, February 2017).
9  According to the UNHCR through interviews with Russian speakers with undetermined citizenship or foreign 
citizenship (Russian), 93 percent were pessimistic on accessing the labour market and a further 83 percent were 
pessimistic on having the right of free movement and diplomatic protection (UNHCR, 2016, p. 40). However, 
84 percent had responded with a strong interest in participating more fully in Estonian society (UNHCR, 2016, 
p. 43).
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have a direct effect on the lives of the Russian minorities (M. Makarova, MISA, personal 
interview, February 2017; A. Semjonov, LICHR, personal interview, February 2017; D. 
Suhoroslov, Russian School, personal interview, February 2017). In particular, MISA stated 
that it was imperative for the Russian-speaking minorities to enjoy the same rights as ethnic 
Estonians because social exclusion and dissatisfaction leads to more isolation and more ani-
mosity towards the dominant group. This in turn makes them more susceptible to external 
influence. LICHR revealed deep concern that the Estonian public analysis consistently 
frames the Russian minority vis-à-vis the external Russian aggression. The organization 
advocates for Estonian politicians, border security, and policemen to reconsider the damag-
ing preconceived biases when dealing with members of the Russian-speaking community. 
An interviewee from the Russian School further stated that harsh integration policies in 
Estonia lack respect for the historical and ethnic dignity of the Russians since it perpetuates 
assimilationist ideals, rather than ideals of laissez-faire and allowing Russians to govern their 
societal affairs. 
While these interviewees’ perspectives do not always overlap, representatives of 
Russian-speaking minorities often emphasize that the rhetoric produced by geopolitical 
discourse often has a negative effect on the security and societal ‘belonging’ of the minor-
ity.  Indeed, increasingly progressive language, citizenship, and education policies are at 
the forefront of political discourse surrounding minority rights and integration policy. 
Still, integration as a means of increasing trust and societal cohesion through the respect of 
minority rights should rightly be considered within such discourses.
2.2 The Spatial Factor 
Since Soviet times, Russian speakers have tended to concentrate in segregated 
communities, specifically in the city of Narva and the local level such as in the Mustamäe 
neighborhood in Tallinn (Trimbach, 2016, p. 88). By 2011, ethnic minorities formed 46 
percent of the population in Tallinn and 86 percent of the population of the northeastern 
cities. Soviet labour and housing policies, such as immigration-based industrialization and 
central housing allocation, exacerbated and strengthened ethnic spatial separation in Estonia 
(Tammaru & Kontuly, 2011, p. 677). After the demise of the Soviet Union, out-migration 
resulted in Estonians being more likely to leave ethnic areas than minorities, thus indirectly 
increasing ethnic concentration in various regions (Tammaru & Kontuly, 2011, p. 685).
One particular assumption is that because Narva is so immediate to Ivangorod 
(and only 160 kilometers from St. Petersburg) the Russian-speaking minorities are more 
inclined to feel sympathy towards the Russian state and therefore more likely to advocate 
for irredentist interests. This, however, is not likely the case.  Citizens of Narva perceive 
Ivangorod as “different, Russian-like, unstable, and chaotic” (Berg, 2000, p. 88). Narvans 
are aware about late salary payments, low wages, and stand-still enterprises in Russia and 
therefore are more likely to be content with articulating a more localized identity (Berg, 
2000, p. 88). In fact, there is a positive net-migration of Russians from Ivangorod into 
Estonia due to the higher standard of living and familial ties to the Russian speakers in 
Estonia (K. Kallas, Narva College, personal interview, February 2017). This is telling given 
the rich discourse in international media as identifying the northeastern region, and par-
ticularly Narva, as a vigilantly pro-Russian and potentially separatist region ranked with the 
likes of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The authors’ research found that outside of a small 
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minority of radicalized Russian speakers, most identify geopolitically with Estonia (M. 
Hellam & M. Roonemaa, Open Estonia Foundation, personal interview, February 2017). 
In socioeconomic terms, Estonians certainly gained more from the transition 
process (Tammaru & Kontuly, 2011, p. 685). While major towns in the north (Tallinn), 
the southeast (Tartu) and the south-west (Pärnu) grew during the immediate post-Soviet 
period; northeastern Estonia declined due to out-migration to Russia, the European Union, 
or other parts of Estonia. Industrial towns in previously urban northeast locations suffered 
from deep economic and political restructuring during the 1990s (Jauhiainen, 2006, p. 275). 
In terms of employment, the massive downturn reflected in the loss of 21 percent of jobs 
in sites of heavy manufacturing. Since the population in the northeast was mostly Russian-
speaking, the disproportionality in unemployment and industries became linked with an 
ethno-geographic divide. 
 In present day, Ida-Viru County and Narva suffer from high rates of unemploy-
ment, outmigration, and economic decline. These issues fuel the “othering” of the region 
in relation to the Estonian state, formation and political processes, spaces, and relations 
(Trimbach, 2016, p. 98). According to figures from the UNHCR, Russian speakers with 
undetermined citizenship remain at the peak of socioeconomic inequality (“Mapping 
Statelessness,” 2016).10  Ida-Viru’s divergent trajectory is problematic since the region 
depends on regional integration and financial investment in order to stabilize (Trimbach, 
2016, p. 102). This “one state, two societies” system continues to thwart socioeconomic 
integration of the northeastern Russian-speaking community (Trimbach, 2016, p. 95). 
One frequently proposed solution to the spatial factor is the movement of state 
institutions and programs into the northeastern region of Estonia. Moving state agencies to 
Narva may have some integrationist influences on the region. However, equalizing oppor-
tunities in quality jobs and providing incentives to engage the Russian youth—who are, 
indeed, increasingly westward facing—is paramount (M. Makarova, MISA, personal inter-
view, February 2017). The Ministry of Culture (A. Aidarov, personal interview, February 
2017), Ministry of Interior (M. Tulit, personal interview, February 2017) and Open Estonia 
Foundation (M. Hellam & M. Roonemaa, Open Estonia Foundation, personal interview, 
February 2017) agree that the government must facilitate and support intercultural events, 
empower local initiatives and forums relating to innovation and education. The spatial fac-
tor must therefore carefully be considered while adjusting integration programs and poli-
cies. This factor, as it relates to language and education policy in the next section, ultimately 
increases the difficulty in which funding, programming, and policy operates.
10  According to data collection by the UNHCR, it is suggested that unemployment for those with undetermined 
citizenship is 14.5 percent compared to 6.5 percent for Estonian citizens; 11 percent of persons with undetermined 
citizenship have completed higher education, compared to 26-30 percent of Estonian citizenships; 24.1 percent of 
those with undetermined citizenship are at risk of poverty compared to 14.5 of general Estonian population;  and 
those with undetermined citizenship make 30 percent of prison population while only accounting for roughly 6 
percent of the population (UNHCR, 2016, p. 30-p.35).
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2.3 The Integration Triangle: Citizenship, Language and Education 
Figure 1. The Integration Triangle. This figure illustrates the three-way connectivity and 
overlapping expressions of language, citizenship, and education policy. Language, as the 
central method of communication between the titular and minority groups, becomes 
prevalent in all three policy dimensions. 
Policy outputs in Estonia are reflective of ideological underpinnings affecting 
both the drive towards security and stabilization, and the conscious reflection of the Soviet 
past. Nation-building, rapidly developing throughout the 1990s, was an ideological force 
dependent on de-Sovietization and re-Europeanization (Duina & Miani, 2016, p. 536). 
This was carried out by both right and left wing parties who either saw nation-building as 
either exclusively ethnic based or fully inclusive of the polyethnic realities (Kallas, 2016, p. 
9). Citizenship and language planning policy was particularly vital in formulating nation-
building, ethnic containment, and managing linguistic threats (Jarve, 2002, p. 78). These 
simultaneous processes informed present-day legacies of undetermined citizenship identity, 
socioeconomic disparities, a lack of social unity, and conflicting language policies. 
The following sections analyze various perspectives on policy outcomes related to 
citizenship, education, and language. It is noted that language is overlapping in both educa-
tion and citizenship policies. Language, itself, has been the primary method of preserving 
Estonian as the sole official language in the country. Similarly, language ability has become 
the formal assessment of the individual’s naturalization within Estonian society. Language 
acquisition, language exams and language inspections are the fundamental processes in 
which the government ensures that integration formally develops in respects to the titular 
standard. 
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2.3.1 Language and Citizenship
In 1991, Estonia’s independence brought a restoration of the Citizenship Law 
that had operated prior to 1940. The modified law, which entered into force in 1992, 
was defined by its restorative nature; roughly 32 percent of the Estonian population was 
left with undetermined citizenship (UNHCR, 2016, p. 15). With the establishment of the 
Alien Act and further provisions to the 1995 Citizenship Act, in adherence to international 
pressures, Estonia began providing similar rights to all individuals that had legally resided 
in Estonia for a minimum of 5 years.11 From 1992 to 2015 there was a total reduction of 
48 percent of those with undetermined citizenship (UNHCR, 2016, p. 16). More recent 
provisions have made the process even quicker for children. As of January 2016, a child 
born to parents with undetermined citizenship who have been residing in Estonia for 5 
years could acquire Estonian citizenship automatically (also retroactively entitled for those 
who were under 15 years of age when the policy was imposed) (UNHCR, 2016, p. 77). 
Yet, despite progressions towards a reduction of undetermined citizens there is still much 
debate about the success of policy outcomes related to citizenship in Estonia. 
Estonian nation-building processes continue to guarantee the specific protection 
of its national minority (Duina & Miani, 2016, p. 536). As such, there has been resistance 
amongst the general population to policies that would allow for the granting of full citi-
zenship to all individuals residing in the territory. Debates continuously define the lack 
of integration as a cleavage-producing factor that can erupt at any moment. At the same 
time, internal discussion has also challenged the effectiveness of Estonia’s naturalization 
policy. One specific concern is the overemphasis on the naturalization of youth, who are 
already able to receive citizenship automatically with the completion of secondary school. 
In contrast, the older generation who require external assistance in achieving language pro-
ficiency, continue to face strict language assessments in order to naturalize (A. Semjonov, 
LICHR, personal interview, February 2017). This point is especially relevant since the 
vast majority of those who are without citizenship are above 30 years of age (“Mapping 
Statelessness,” p. 29). 
The amount of time and money required to complete Estonian language classes 
poses a challenge for some (M. Hellam & M. Roonemaa, Open Estonia Foundation, per-
sonal interview, February 2017). Some interviewees indicated that the Russian speakers 
require stronger socioeconomic incentives to complete language classes (T. Jermalavičius, 
ICDS, personal interview, February 2017). The Ministry of Interior pointed out that free 
language classes have been limited in long-term funding, which poses difficulty for those 
in the lower socioeconomic bracket (M. Tulit, personal interview, February 2017). With 
an absence of free language classes, Russian speakers are required to financial support their 
11  Estonia is a signatory country to the Convention for the Rights of Children, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination but not to the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The Conventions that 
Estonia has signed have contributed to a compliance to international standards on the rights to dignity and the 
wellbeing of the undetermined population. However, Estonia has argued, in response to the UNHCR’s recom-
mendations on the signing of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions that ratifying the Conventions would obstruct the 
ability of the undetermined citizenship population to choose their choice of citizenship - be it Russia or another 
country (UNHCR, 2016 p. 17).
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own means of acquiring Estonian fluency. 
Intersecting citizenship, language and the spatial divide, MISA highlighted that 
informal language education can be useful in regions where Russian residents may lack 
opportunities to immerse themselves in the Estonian language, such as those living in 
Narva. MISA suggests that allocating funds into, for instance, language cafes might be 
particularly useful in helping those who are not only required to pass language exams but 
require it for employment purposes (M. Makarova, MISA, personal interview, February 
2017). Vitatiim Narva Youth Organization confirmed the popularity of language cafes and 
informal learning amongst the youth, albeit Estonian remains one of the more unpopular 
languages to learn12 (personal interview, February 2017). The geopolitical and minority 
rights perspective converge on many points related to language and citizenship rights. In 
particular, it appears that there is a push, on all sides, for a facilitation of a faster and more 
realistic process for Russian speakers to naturalize.
Various interviewees articulated that incentives to preserve the ‘grey passport13’ 
hinder the success of the naturalization process. Specifically, practical benefits related to 
having the undetermined status, such as travelling cost free across the EU and Russia, 
have been cited by Russian speakers as reasons that dissuade them from wanting Estonian 
citizenship (A. Aidarov, Ministry of Culture, personal interview, February 2017). Despite 
concerns on the overall strategies of naturalization, there was a large consensus amongst 
interviewees about the importance of integration through citizenship. Having access to 
political participation at the national level was cited as a method in which individuals could 
participate democratically and voice their grievances (A. Kasekemp, Estonian Foreign 
Policy Institute, personal interview, February 2017). While interviewees expressed con-
cern that Russia could use undetermined citizens as a visible leverage for diplomatic goals, 
undetermined citizens in general were not seen to pose a direct threat to the safety of the 
country (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, February 2017, M. Hellam & M. 
Roonemaa, Open Estonia Foundation, personal interview, February 2017). Ultimately, all 
interviewees see the reduction in undetermined citizenship as a progressive step towards 
minority integration in Estonia.
2.3.2 Language and Education 
One of the most drastic changes in Estonian language policies post-independence 
is the change in the language of instruction in previously Russian-medium schools. In 
Estonia, the minority group is allowed, albeit somewhat restricted, the right to choose the 
primary language of instruction for schooling. Many Russian students, particularly those 
living in the northeastern county of Ida-Viru, attend Russian-speaking schools. While some 
have switched into Estonian schools or immersion programs, 19 percent of all students in 
the country are solely enrolled in Russian education (UNHCR, 2016, p. 31). Tensions 
have emerged as policy makers have swayed between allowing Russians to regulate their 
12  Based on our interview with Vitatiim, English has become the most popular choice of language for Russian 
speakers as it provides future opportunities and incentives to work abroad. 
13  Grey passports are synonymous with the undetermined citizenship status. Those with undetermined citizen-
ship carry a passport that is identifiable by its grey colour. Carrying this passport guarantees individuals certain 
rights and freedoms in travel – although they are subjected to time-dependent visa regulations within the Schen-
gen Area.
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own language acquisition, having an immersion program for both Estonian and Russian 
students, and/or assimilating Russian pupils into the Estonian language. Shifts in regula-
tions by the Estonian government have occured in response to the perceived divergence of 
Russian-language schools in two dimensions: the quality of education, and the implications 
of Russian curricula. 
The curriculum formulated post-independence was seen as an instrument for 
building a democratic, information-based society that is turning towards Europe, and sup-
porting the establishment of a market economy after decades of communist rule (“Estonia’s 
basic education,” 2015). In accordance to Estonia’s integration plans, the government com-
mitted to guaranteeing equal education opportunities regardless of students’ ethnic origin. 
Specifically, the government allowed for the operation of Russian-language schools insofar 
as upper secondary schools taught 60 percentage of subjects in Estonian during grades 
10-12 so as to facilitate integration of Russian-speakers into Estonian society and economy. 
Funding sources were also established to promote quality in instruction and professional 
development of bilingual teachers (“Estonia’s basic education,” 2015).
Yet, our interviewees maintain that Russian-language schools lag behind in edu-
cational standards due subpar delivery of quality and lack of effective institutional support. 
A PISA assessment in 2006 showed that the average science, reading and mathematics 
scores of 15-year old students in Russian-language schools were significantly lower than 
those 15-year old students in Estonian-language schools (“Estonia’s basic education,” 2015). 
MISA pointed out that the switch to Estonian education in Russian-language schools has 
been problematic because relatively weaker Russian-language students in primary school 
have their difficulties exacerbated with the 60/40 bilingual split in secondary school 
(M. Makarova, personal interview, February 2017). Russian-speaking representatives in 
LICHR (A. Semjonov, personal interview, February 2017) and the Russian School (D. 
Suhoroslov, personal interview, February 2017) reflect these sentiments. 
Understaffing and incompetent bilingual teaching abilities of teachers contribute 
to weak teacher-student communication. As a result, Russian students are unable to receive 
quality education in key areas of growth. Additionally, University of Tartu’s Narva College, 
primarily a teacher training college, has noticed that their bilingual graduates tend to pursue 
higher-paid careers outside of education instead of the intended goal of staffing schools with 
bilingual instructors (K. Kallas, personal interview, February 2017). This is due to the fact 
that teaching in general is not an attractive profession in Estonia (“Estonia’s basic educa-
tion,” 2015). Various interviewees maintain that increased funding for teaching centres in 
universities such as Narva College and higher wages for bilingual staff in schools, especially 
for Russian-speaking schools, is imperative for successful integration outcomes (A. Aidarov, 
Ministry of Culture, personal interview, February 2017). 
In another vein, some interviewees raised concern regarding the content of the 
Russian curriculum taught in Russian schools. ICDS, for example, suggested that it is vital 
that the history and social sciences taught in Russian schools maintain a standard compatible 
with all schools in Estonia (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, February 2017).  In 
particular, contestation arose regarding the highly politicized history of Russian-Estonian 
relations. Skeptics view the teaching of Russian history and Soviet occupation as a possible 
venue for the spreading of disinformation (T. Jermalavičius, ICDS, personal interview, 
February 2017). On the other hand, some interviewees have stated that the teaching of 
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history in Russian schools should be reflective of the Russian historical understanding of 
events (A. Semjonov, LICHR, personal interview, 2017). Decisions on the delivery of cur-
riculum are often left to the discretion of the respective teacher and schooling institution. 
Integrative measures within the aforementioned context of lagging Russian-
speaking schools have certainly created a backlash amongst some Russian-speakers in 
Estonia. Integrative measures by way of promoting bilingualism and injecting Estonian-
centric curricula have prompted some Russian-representing NGOs to articulate fears of 
cultural assimilation. The Russian School, for instance, gathered over 35, 000 signatures 
petitioning the Estonian government to allow Russian-speaking communities to deliver 
upper-year education exclusively in Russian, so as not to linguistically disadvantage youth 
in their learning. The petition’s rejection by the Estonian government reinforced atti-
tudes amongst Russian representatives that Estonians see Russian-language schools as an 
‘existential threat’ to the nation-state (D. Suhoroslov, Russian School, personal interview, 
February 2017). This is not to say that Estonian is not valued amongst those Russian speak-
ing parents. Instead, in interviews they prioritized informal methods of language attainment 
such as afterschool classes, conversation groups, summer camps, etc rather than the institu-
tionalization of Estonian as the primary language (D. Suhoroslov, Russian School, personal 
interview, February 2017).
 Despite the nuance and sensitivity surrounding education policies, both Russian-
speaking and mainstream Estonian interviewees acknowledged that certain integrationist 
approaches must be considered for nation-building and a cohesive society. First and fore-
most, consultations between the Estonian government and Russian-speaking communities 
regarding education policy must be improved in order to address shortfalls in bilingual crite-
ria and understaffing (D. Suhoroslov, Russian School, personal interview, February 2017). 
Additionally, interviewees addressed the importance of alternative avenues of language 
learning, such as informal learning and practical immersion programs between mainstream 
Estonian schools and Russian-language schools (M. Makarova, MISA, personal interview, 
February 2017; A. Semjonov, LICHR, personal interview, 2017). 
Conclusion: Measuring Success
Although Estonia has progressed rapidly to include more favorable policies towards 
its Russian-speaking minority, there is still much debate surrounding the success criteria 
of each individual policy. In particular, questions surrounding the potential for Russia to 
utilize extraterritorial Russians as diplomatic leverage have become a key debate in geo-
politics. At the same time, language planning and language acquisition policy, alongside 
citizenship policies, have consistently become a concern for the Russian-speaking minori-
ties and the organizations that advocate on their behalf. In the qualitative interviews, the 
authors addressed the broader role of governmental and nongovernmental organizations in 
considering aspects of integration, citizenship, and education; and the particularities of civil 
society groups that have a personal connection to the Russian localities and lived experi-
ences. The report then converged these scopes and produced a more nuanced analysis of 
what integration looks like and means for the Russian-speaking minority vis-à-vis Estonian 
state policy. By positioning the various perspectives on the (un)success of policy outcomes, 
the authors identified the ways in which policies yield different, but equally substantive, 
understandings of integration. 
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During a period of continued strain between Estonia and Russia, the Estonian 
government is compelled to adopt policies aimed at protecting its ethnic citizens and ter-
ritorial boundaries from potential instability. For some the guise of integration is used as a 
securitization technique to minimize the potential eruption of conflict, rather than serving 
as genuine progression towards the inclusivity of the Russian-speaking minority. This is not 
to say that the threat of Russian hybrid attacks and second-generation warfare, especially 
those involving disinformation and propaganda, is to be dismissed; rather, the Estonian gov-
ernment should continue actively working with powerful multilateral organizations such 
as NATO to combat hostile interference. Under the terms of Article 5 of NATO, if one 
member-state is invaded all the other members are collectively obliged to come to their aid 
(Mortimer, 2017). The annexation of Crimea in Ukraine by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin began a process of bolstering defense in the Baltic region: at this time, hundreds of 
United Kingdom, French, and Danish forces have landed in Estonia as part of NATO’s 
Enhanced Forward Presence Battalion in one of the largest deployments since the end of 
the Cold War (Mortimer, 2017).
  Indeed, Estonia is an active member-state and one of the only members that 
meets its required defense contribution (Baker, 2017). Importantly, however, the 2016 
election of United States President Donald J. Trump and his disenchantment with NATO 
revealed a disconcerting reality that Estonia can no longer exclusively and unquestionably 
rely on the patronage of Western troops—for NATO is crippled without American diplo-
matic and financial backing. The authors of this report maintain that the Estonian govern-
ment will combat the Russian threat most effectively by addressing and resolving, in both, 
a top-down and grassroots manner the disparities in education, citizenship, and language 
outcomes for the Russian-speaking population. In the following list, the authors summa-
rize some general recommendations regarding the Russian-speaking minority, converging 
opinions from the qualitative interviews and supporting secondary research.
Recommendations: Geopolitics1) Hybrid threats are continuing to pose a security risk for the Baltic countries. 
Cyberwarfare and disinformation must continue to be present on the govern-
ment’s security agenda in order to ensure that information spheres are secure 
for all residence living in Estonia.2) Russian language television channels in Estonia must provide a variety of 
broadcasting that is both informative and entertaining. At the same time, 
the broadcasting companies must meet regulatory standards on the informa-
tion that is broadcasted to deter false reports and disinformation for Russian 
speakers.3) Organizations and civil society groups in Estonia must include a diverse array 
of Russian-speaking perspectives when discussing Estonia’s role towards, and 
diplomatic relation with, Russia. 4) Since Russian speakers are particularly vulnerable and central to discussions 
surrounding conflict and threats, caution must be taken to separate the fram-
ing of the Russian government and the Russian people as singular entities. 
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Recommendations: Integration1) Spatial considerations must be prioritized so that areas consisting of large 
Russian-speaking minorities resume positive migratory flows. While this 
would involve complex analysis on economic restructuring of the region, 
interviewees have emphasized the importance of stable and secure jobs in 
minimizing migration and dissatisfaction.2) Informal exchange opportunities can contribute to intercultural relations 
between youth from Russian-speaking parts of Estonia and those from 
Estonian-speaking areas. 3) While naturalization has become easier for youth, more accommoda-
tion is needed for Russian-speaking adults with undetermined citizenship. 
Accommodation through free language classes and informal practice oppor-
tunities is needed. Similarly, there is a call for lenience or the full abolishing 
of the language inspectors who fine individuals unable to communicate in 
Estonian at their workplace. 4) Involve those with undetermined citizenship in more governmental consulta-
tions. Since those with undetermined citizenship are not granted the right to 
vote in national elections, alternative avenues must be established for voicing 
concerns.5) The government should look into full-immersion programs and informal 
language learning classes as mechanisms of integration for Russian-speakers. 6) The Estonian government must funnel more funds into equitably allocating 
teaching resources between Estonian and Russian schools and adequately 
training Estonian and Russian teachers so that neither language-speaking stu-
dent is disadvantaged in primary and secondary education.
Author's Notes
 We would like to express gratitude to the Estonian Scholarship Fund as facilitated 
through the University of Toronto, for funding our research project in Estonia between 
February 16th and 28th, 2017. We would also like to express gratitude for the ongoing sup-
port of our University of Toronto Supervising Professor Dragana Obradovic, the Slavic 
Languages and Literatures Department at the University of Toronto, and the New College 
Registrar Office at the University of Toronto. Lastly, we would like to express our appre-
ciation to our various multilevel interviewees:
University of Tartu, Vello Pettai
University of Kansas, David J. Trimbach
VitaTiim Narva Youth Organization
Estonian Ministry of Culture, Aleksandr Aidarov
Estonian Ministry of Interior, Martin Tulit 
University of Tartu’s Narva College, Kristina Kallas 
Integration and Migration Foundation (MISA), Marianna Makarova 
Open Estonia Foundation, Mall Hellam and Mari Roonemaa
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR), Aleksei Semjonov
Russian School in Estonia, Dmitri Suhoroslov
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/10
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 1 1 9
Canadian Embassy in Tallinn, Kairi-Liis Ustav
International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), Tomas Jermalavičius
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Andres Kasekamp
Global Affairs Canada, Angela Karr and Andrew Gedris
Annual Baltic Defense College Conference on Russia 2017, Molly McKew 
References
Agarin, T. (2012). A Cat’s Lick: Democratisation and Minority Communities in the Post-
Soviet Baltic. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Baker, Peter. (2017, May, 26).  Trump Says NATO Allies Don’t Pay Their Share. Is 
That True? The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/05/26/world/europe/nato-trump-spending.html 
Bennich-Bjorkmana, Li. & Johansson K.M. (2012). Explaining moderation in nationalism: 
 Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and Latvia. Com-
parative European Politics, 10(5), 585-607.
Berg, E. (2000). Deconstructing border practices in the Estonian Russian borderland. Geo-
politics, 5(3), 78-98. 
Bruggemann, K. & Kasekamp, A. (2008). The Politics of History and the “War of Monu-
ments” in Estonia. Nationalities Papers, 36.
Cilevics, B. (2007). Language Legislation in the Baltic States. In Koenig, Matthias, & Gu-
chteneire (Eds.), Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies (pp. 
167-185). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Duina, F. & Miani, C. (2015). Fitting in the Baltics: National identity, minorities and 
compliance with EU accession requirements in Lithuania and Latvia. Comparative 
European Politics, 13(5), 535-552. 
Galbreath, D. (2007). Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States. Stutt-
gart, Germany: ibidem Press.
Jarve, P. (2002). Two Waves of Language Laws in the Baltic States: Changes of Rationale. 
 Journal of Baltic Studies, 33(1), 78-110.
Jauhiainen, J. S. (2006). Demographic, employment and administrative challenges for urban 
 policies in Estonia. European Planning Studies,14(2), 273-283.
Joesaar, A. (2015). One Country, Two Polarised Audiences: Estonia and the Deficiency 
of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Media and Communications, 3(4), 
45-51.
Kalinina, E. (2016). Narratives of Russia’s “Information Wars”. Politics in Central Europe. 
12(1), 147-165.
Kallas, K. (2016). Revisiting the triadic nexus: An analysis of the ethnopolitical interplay 
 between Estonia, Russia and Estonian Russians. Tartu, Estonia: University of Tartu 
Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Lanoszka, A. (2016). Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe. 
 International Affairs, 92(1), 175-195.
Lucas, E. & Pomeranzev, P. (2016). Winning the Information War. Centre for European 
Policy Analysis. Retrieved from http://cepa.org/reports/winning-the-Informa-
Integration Policy and Outcomes
1 2 0 Silviu Kondan and Mridvika Sahajpal University of Toronto
tion-War
Ministry of Culture (2014). Integrating Estonia 2020. Retrieved from http://www.kul.ee/
en/integrating-estonia-2020
Mortimer, C. (2017, March, 18). First of 800 UK troops arrive in Estonia to face off against 
 Putin as part of NATO show of strength. The Independent. Retrieved from: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/uk-troops-deploy-estonia-baltic-
nato-russia-security-threat-military-a7636456.html 
Open Estonia Foundation & Saar Poll. (2014). Current Events and Different Sources of 
 Information. Tallinn. Retrieved from https://oef.org.ee/fileadmin/media/val-
jaanded/uuringud/Current_events_and_different_sources_of_information__2_.pdf
Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Education and Research. (n.d.). PISA 2015: Estonia’s basic 
education is the best in Europe. Retrieved March 26, 2017, from https://www.
hm.ee/en/news/pisa-2015-estonias-basic-education-best-europe
Tammaru, T., & Kontuly, T. (2010). Selectivity and destinations of ethnic minorities leav-
ing the main gateway cities of Estonia. Population, Space and Place,17(5), 674-688. 
The World Bank. (2016). Military Expenditure (% of GDP). Retrieved from 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS 
Trimbach, D. J. (2016). CITIZENSHIP CAPITAL & POLITICAL POWER IN ESTO-
NIA (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Kansas.
UNHCR. (2016). Mapping Statelessness in Estonia. Retreived from http://www.unhcr.
org/neu/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/01/UNHCR-Statelessness_in_Esto-
nia-ENG-screen.pdf 
Veebel, V. (2015). Russian Propaganda, Disinformation, and Estonia’s Experience. Foreign 
 Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/rus-
sian-propaganda-disinformation-and-estonias-experience/
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/10
